We investigate the effect of energy liberalisations on policies that support renewable energy in a long panel of OECD countries. We estimate this effect accounting for the endogeneity of liberalisation related to joint decisions within a country's energy strategy. Using regulation in other industries as instruments, we find that energy liberalisation increases the public support to renewable energy. The effect of liberalisation is the second largest after the effect of per-capita income and is fully driven by reductions in entry barriers, while the effect of privatisation is negative. Finally, our results are robust to dynamic specifications and various policy indicators.
Introduction
Environmental problems typically call for government interventions to address the market failures associated with pollution and investment in green technologies. Although international policy agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol have acquired prominence in the public debate, national policies still represent the main tools to fight climate change and global warming.
Compared to other environmental policies, policies that support renewable energy (REPs henceforth) affect several targets other than pollution abatement, such as energy security, technological change and energy efficiency, because REPs are often combined with measures that promote energy efficiency. For instance, technological learning is particularly important to reduce the cost of energy production from renewable sources relative to that of traditional ones.
Energy security is also a long-term and uncertain objective of REP because renewables are difficult to store and require backup capacity from traditional fossil-fuel plants. 1 To the best of our knowledge, only a few papers have empirically investigated the determinants of REPs (see, e.g., Lyon and Yin 2010, Jenner et al. 2012) . However, by focusing on the adoption of a specific REP, these papers have neglected the fact that each country uses an array of policy instruments to promote renewable energy (RE). Recent research has shown that an appropriate policy mix that combines policies to reduce pollution (e.g., emission trading schemes) with policies for learning (e.g., RE production subsidies) and innovation (e.g., R&D subsidies) stimulates the search for new technological solutions rather than mere compliance with existing standards. 2 Following on this argument, we examine the determinants of REP indicators that combine various policy measures; therefore, we complement previous studies by analysing the overall country's commitment to RE rather than the intensity of a single REP. 1 An evaluation of the welfare effects of REPs is beyond the scope of this paper. In general, these policies appear to have a positive effect on RE technologies (Johnstone et al., 2010) , with a remarkably stronger effect on highquality inventions (Nesta et al., 2014) and a weaker one on per-capita investments in renewable capacity, which is a proxy for technology diffusion (Popp et al., 2011) . Moreover, the various policy instruments have displayed heterogeneous effects across various technologies (Johnstone et al., 2010) . Finally, Jenner et al. (2013) for EU states and Yin and Powers (2009) for US states evaluate the impact of, respectively, feed-in-tariffs (FITs) and renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) on RE electricity generation. The former paper finds that FITs have a positive effect on solar but not on wind development, and the latter finds a positive effect of RPSs on RE deployment. See also Schmalensee (2012) for an original and provocative discussion of the pros and cons of REPs. 2 See, e.g., Fisher and Newell (2008) Our empirical analysis contributes to the growing empirical literature on environmental political economy. A well-established result in this literature is that policy stringency is negatively associated with the level of corruption, which is interpreted as a proxy for the brown lobby's ability to influence environmental policies (e.g., Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003 ; Damania et al., 2003) . Although corruption is certainly a good measure of the quality and independence of the political system, it does not capture the sector-specific features of the political process that are highlighted in the literature on lobbying (Helpman and Grossman, 1994). The recent wave of energy market liberalisations offers a unique opportunity to investigate the effect of a decrease in the incumbents' lobbying power, which is proportional to their market power, on a sectoral policy aimed at improving citizens' welfare, i.e., REPs. In this paper, we show that liberalisation has a large effect on the adoption of REPs by controlling for corruption and environmental preferences.
The new mechanism highlighted here is not obvious: even if the adoption of REPs and liberalisations went hand-in-hand in the last two decades, the two policies were implemented for different reasons. The former had the main objective of reducing electricity prices, while the latter's primary targets were environmental externalities through the support of cleaner but more expensive energy sources. However, there are two reasons for liberalisations to have an independent and perhaps unintended effect on REP. First, granting free access to the grid to new and often smaller players is likely to favour decentralised energy production, which is highly compatible with RE generation. Because large utilities have a comparative advantage in centralised energy production, they will contest the approval of REPs to avoid jeopardising their investments. Conversely, new players are likely to invest in small-scale productions, including renewable ones. Lowering entry barriers should reduce the capacity of utilities to influence energy policies and should favour the emergence of new green actors. Therefore, we expect a positive effect of liberalisation on REPs. Second, the typical state-owned monopoly that characterises the energy sector before liberalisation should be willing to internalise the pollution externalities stemming from traditional energy sources. As a result, it should be easier to support REPs in a market with widespread public ownership than in a market dominated by private utilities. Overall, which effect prevails is an empirical issue that we investigate by exploiting variation in policies in 28 OECD countries over 28 years.
The identification of the effect of liberalisation on REPs is problematic because the two variables are affected by common determinants such as unobservable institutional quality and are two features of a country's energy strategy. Moreover, our index of regulation, which is the product market regulation (PMR henceforth) in the electricity sector developed in the OECD, is an imperfect proxy for the effective incumbents' market power, on which the capacity to capture policies depends. Because controlling for country fixed effects and for institutional factors may alleviate but not fully solve this problem, we use regulation in other sectors to instrument regulation in electricity. The idea is that widespread liberalisations are implemented to pursue general goals and reflect policy learning and the diffusion of a liberal political ideology. The sequence of reforms across sectors validates our instrument choice, as Three main findings stand out clearly from our analysis. First, we find that a higher degree of regulation in electricity undermines the approval of ambitious REPs. Second, this effect is considerably larger when accounting for endogeneity in electricity regulation. Third, the effect of liberalisation is fully driven by reductions in entry barriers, while privatisation has a negative effect on REPs.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the drivers of environmental and energy policies in greater detail. Section 3 describes our instrumental variable (IV) strategy and the REP indicators used as dependent variables. In Section 4, we present the main results for various indicators and various features of the liberalisation process using a dynamic specification. The final section concludes the paper.
Drivers of Renewable Energy Policies
Theoretical and empirical studies on the determinants of environmental policy agree on the prominent role of private and public interest in affecting policy outcomes (e.g., Peltzman 1976). Formal politico-economy models are generally inspired by the seminal paper of Grossman and Helpman (1994), in which multiple lobbies attempt to capture sector-specific policies by offering perspective bribes to politicians. The basic model's prediction is that the extent to which the chosen level of environmental tax differs from the optimal Pigouvian tax depends on the lobbies' capacity to influence policy (see, e.g., Fredriksson, 1997; Aidt, 1998).
In turn, this difference depends on the weights the politician assigns to social welfare and citizens' preferences on the one hand and to the lobbies' bribes on the other. Empirically, the weight assigned to brown lobby bribes has been approximated by the level of corruption, which has been shown to negatively affect the stringency of environmental regulation. 3 Although the negative effect of corruption on environmental policy is a consolidated result, using a sectoral measure of the brown lobby appears more appealing when the policy of interest is also sector specific, as in the case of REPs.
The political process in the energy sector is well described by a lobbying game. Damania and Fredriksson (2000) show that the incentive to form lobbies to influence environmental policies is stronger in highly polluting sectors such as the energy sector. (Jenner et al., 2012 ). This opposition is primarily related to the intrinsic comparative advantage of large utilities in centralised energy production. Whereas the production of energy from renewable sources is decentralised in small to medium-sized units, the competencies of utilities are tied to large-scale plants using coal, nuclear power or gas as the primary energy inputs. The high sunk costs of large-scale generation further exacerbate the technological lock-in of incumbents and fuel their political opposition to the distributed generation paradigm involving the diffuse use of RE. At the same time, however, the mere replacement of public utilities with private ones will not result in more political support for REPs as long as large private players do not internalise the negative externalities generated by fossil-fuel plants. 3 Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) extend the Helpman and Grossman (1994) and Fredriksson (1997) models to include political instability. Their model shows that the effect of corruption decreases when political instability increases because incumbent officeholders are less able to credibly commit to a policy. This prediction is confirmed in their empirical analysis of the stringency of environmental regulation in agriculture. Other aspects of the impact of corruption on environmental policies are considered in variants of the same models and tested empirically by In summary, we expect that the recent reduction in entry barriers, i.e., opening new producers' access to the grid, should have favoured the adoption of ambitious REPs but that the mere privatisation of energy utilities should have reduced the support for REPs. Our empirical strategy allows us to test these two predictions along with the overall effect of liberalisation on RE policy indicators.
The paper of Jenner et al. (2012) is closely related to ours as it estimates the effects of the green and brown lobbies, which they also proxied with the PMR, on the probability of adopting feed-in tariffs (FITs) or renewable energy certificates (RECs). Our work extends this work in four directions. First, we address the issue of endogeneity in the effect of energy market liberalisation. Second, we build an indicator of policy commitment to capture various dimensions of public support for RE (see Section 3.2). Third, we disentangle two aspects of the liberalisation process that are expected to have contrasting effects on REPs: entry barrier reduction and privatisation. Finally, we modify the set of controls to better account for environmental preferences. In particular, following a simple median voter argument, citizens' willingness to pay for higher environmental quality depends on both the first and second moment of the income distribution. Because environmental quality is a normal good, wealthier households demand more stringent environmental policies, which is a prediction consistent with the empirical evidence at both the micro and macro levels. 4 In turn, for a given level of income per capita, a lower level of inequality implies a richer median voter and thus greater support for ambitious policies, as recent theoretical and empirical studies have shown. 5 In sum, whether the increasing willingness to pay for cleaner energy has been more important than the liberalisation process in explaining the rapid adoption of REPs remains an unresolved issue that we attempt to address in the following. Kempf and Rossignol (2007) , McAusland (2003) and Vona and Patriarca (2011) . In general, a large political economy literature considers inequality to be a political driver through median voter preferences, see, e.g., Lindert (1996) and Perotti (1996) .
Empirical Protocol

Empirical Strategy
Exploiting the panel dimension of our data, we are interested in estimating the effect of an index of electricity market regulation (PMR , or PMR when we wish to distinguish energy regulation from regulation in other sectors) on an indicator of REP commitment for country i at time t, conditional to a set of controls:
We include country and time effects to eliminate, respectively, time-invariant unobservable factors affecting REP, such as wind and solar endowments, and common time shocks, such as cyclical trends. The right-hand-side variables are lagged one year to capture the retard in the effect of institutional factors on policy outcomes. The vector of controls is composed of variables that depict the evolution of preferences and other institutional constraints that are likely to affect REPs. 6 The minimal set of controls used in this study includes the usual proxy of the brown lobby, i.e., an index of the perception of corruption, and the two variables to account for environmental preferences, i.e., GDP per capita and income inequality. Our favourite specification adds two features of a country's energy strategy, i.e., the share of energy produced from nuclear power and energy dependency. Finally, we consider an extended specification where we include two proxies for the green lobby, i.e., the share of green deputies in the parliament and a dummy equal to one since the year in which a solar association began (Jenner et al., 2012) , a measure of energy intensity and the Polity 2 index capturing the level of democracy. 7 We prefer not to include energy prices to avoid additional an endogeneity problem due to the joint determination of REP, PMR and energy 6 The data sources are standard and hence reported in Table 1 . For our two main variables of interest, REPs and PMR, the data sources are presented in the Appendix. 7 Environmental policies tend to be more stringent in democratic societies. These arguments support our claim that instrumenting PMR is better than including a larger set of political controls. Our IV strategy is designed especially to solve the measurement error bias. We argue that liberalisations are more likely to be successful and hence effective in By way of example, the model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) shows that labour market deregulation becomes more 8 According to standard econometric theory (Wooldridge, 2002) , the module of the OLS coefficient is downwardly biased in the presence of measurement error. Therefore, if the effect of the variable affected by measurement error is negative, the OLS estimate is biased upward. 9 Notice that a good candidate instrument for liberalisation used by a large literature cannot be used here: rightand left-wing politics have preferences on both REP and PMR, and the same is true for government ideology. (2006) provides evidence on the existence of these spillovers between product market reforms, especially in sectors that were deregulated later, such as electricity.
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In summary, the real effect of energy liberalisations on the market power of incumbents, which is the variable that affects REPs, depends on a country's willingness to embrace liberal policies and on the past success of less debatable liberalisations. The bias in the estimated effect of liberalisation thus should disappear when we use the instances of PMR in telecommunication, an industry that was liberalised slightly earlier, and in railways, an industry that has been liberalised in only certain countries, as instruments for PMR in electricity. The former instrument captures regulatory spillovers, and the latter captures the broad country's commitment to liberalisation. Each of these instruments fulfils the two crucial conditions for being a good instrument. That is,
The first condition is a standard exogeneity condition that should be satisfied if unobservable variables, i.e., unobservable market power and lobbying effort, in the electricity sector are uncorrelated with telecommunication or railway regulation. The second condition simply states that the instrument is a good predictor of the endogenous variable and hence that the 11 An evaluation of the effect of liberalisation on welfare is beyond the scope of this paper. The general consensus is that liberalisation does not reduce electricity prices (e.g., Fiorio and Florio, 2013) and that the effect on energy R&D expenditures is negative (e.g., Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008; Sterlacchini, 2012) . 12 A related argument is that partial liberalisations may have a completely different effect on REP than full liberalisation. Chick (2011) and Pollitt (2012) suggest that partial liberalisation is likely to emerge because governments wish to maintain their ability to subsidise favoured interest groups. In this case, an external instrument that captures a country's willingness to liberalise in other sectors should convey more information on the true level of regulation in the electricity sector than the observed measure of regulation in electricity. Before presenting the main results of the paper, the next sub-section describes the policy indicators we use to measure a country's commitment to RE.
Policy Indicators
In the case of renewable energy, both theory and empirical evidence provide strong support for the use of a diversified policy portfolio rather than a specific policy instrument. In particular, a diversified policy portfolio is the best way to target the multiple externalities 14 This increasing diversification makes it exceedingly difficult to provide an aggregate measure of the effort delivered by each country in support of the adoption of RE.
As a further complication, the IEA dataset provides information on only the year of adoption of a specific policy and not on the degree of intensity of the adopted policy. We thus integrate this dataset using other data sources in all cases for which policies measured on a continuous 13 The dataset made available by the International Energy Agency (IEA) contains detailed country fact sheets to construct dummy variables reflecting the adoption time of selected REPs for most OECD countries. 14 Figure 1 also shows that the two main policy drivers of RE occurred in the 1970s and especially from the mid1990s on. The two oil crises of the 1970s stimulated policy responses in nearly all developed countries, but an abrupt halt in the expansion of these policies occurred when oil prices began to decline in the early 1980s. A second wave of REP was implemented in the 1990s in response to increasing concerns related to climate change mitigation. Regarding the adopted policy, certain cross-country regularities clearly emerge. This phenomenon justifies the inclusion of time effects in our econometric specification to capture these common shocks.
scale are available. Intensity measures are available for the following three instruments:
public R&D expenditures in renewable energy, FITs and RECs (see Table 1 for a full description of the policies and data sources).
[ PCs). The PCs are linear combinations of the wider set of original variables that maximise the explained covariance of the data. In our case, we construct our preferred PCA indicator (REP_fact) using the three available continuous policies (FITs, RECs and public R&D) and six dummy variables for the other policy instruments (see Table 1 ). The analysis produces three relevant PCs that together explain approximately 65% of the policy variance.
Interesting, each relevant PC reflects a different policy-type, i.e., quantity, price and innovation (Menanteau et al., 2003) , and has been used to construct REP_fact by taking the simple mean.
To mitigate concerns about the validity of the PCA used to construct our preferred indicator, we conduct extensive robustness checks of our results by using two different aggregation methods. Our second-favourite indicator (REP_poly) was developed by REP_quan and REP_inno, respectively).
In the appendix, we provide further details on the construction of the indicators.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 2 .
[
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The evolution of REP_fact and PMR is depicted in Figure 2 [ In Model 2, we instrument PMR in electricity with the indexes of regulation in the telecommunication and railways sector. The chosen instruments have the expected signs, high explanatory power (the F-test for the first stage is 56.7, which is well above the usual cut-off level of 10), and appear exogenous, as is evident from the p-value of the Hansen tests 16 All of the results presented in Section 3 are impressively robust to the use of an average of PMR in electricity and gas. The magnitude of the effect is approximately 20% larger in this case. The results remain available upon request by the authors. 17 Recall that a higher Corruption Perception Index implies a less corrupted country.
Analysis
Main Results
presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5. 18
Since our exclusion restrictions pass standard specification tests in all of the models presented throughout the paper, we do not comment further on this issue.
When comparing the results of Model 1 and 2, the effect of liberalising the electricity market appears considerably larger in the IV specification. This finding suggests that PMR is positively correlated with an unobservable factor that dampers the public support for renewable energy policies. Such a large bias may be explained with a measurement error argument: an exogenous index of regulation understates the lobbying power of incumbents in highly concentrated sectors such as energy. As a result, we expect the effect of liberalisation to be larger when the commitment of public authorities to liberalisation is more credible and widespread across sectors. We observe that all of the effects are estimated more efficiently in Model 2 than in Model 1. By way of example, the size of the CORR coefficient is now smaller but significant at 99%, and the effect of INEQ is 1/3 larger and also significant at 99%.
Model 3 is our favourite specification, which augments Model 2 to account for two important features of a country's energy strategy, namely the share of energy produced from nuclear power (NUKE) and energy dependency (EN_DEP), i.e., the net energy imports in percentage of total energy use. Although endogeneity may in principle bias the estimates of these two effects, there are good reasons to believe that this is a minor issue. First, both variables display high persistency and either a flat (NUKE) or a decreasing trend, which is concentrated before the take-off in REPs (EN_DEP). Second, EN_DEP is only marginally affected by REPs. In fact, the share of energy produced using new renewable sources (i.e., 18 See Table A1 in the Appendix for detail on the first stage results.
19 Also in Germany, the share of electricity generated from renewable sources increased substantially. However, our results are robust to the exclusion of Denmark and Germany.
We evaluate the magnitude of our effect of interest using coefficients estimated through In doing so, we test the robustness of our results for the subset of most developed countries because data on green deputies are not available for the transition economies Mexico and Turkey. Note that, in general, our results are robust to the exclusion of one country at the time. 21 In other robustness checks, which are available upon request by the authors, we show that our results are robust to a different measure of corruption, i.e., the one developed by the World Bank in the Worldwide Governance Indicator project. Also importantly, our results are robust to the inclusion of the share of capacity from independent power producers (IPPs) to address the issue raised by Schmalensee (2012) on the relationship between IPPs and RE penetration. He suggests that the cost of RE is higher if regulation prescribes a fair rate of return on the sunk costs afforded by utilities. In turn, the cost is lower in states with organised wholesale markets managed by independent system operators where returns of IPPs are not warranted. Controlling for the share of
Different Policy Indicators
Absent a widely accepted methodology to aggregate heterogeneous policies, one may argue that REP_fact imperfectly describes policy support for RE. We thus re-estimate our favourite specification using the alternative indicators described in Section 3.2. In Table 4 , Models 3b and 3c are equivalent to Model 3 except for the policy indicator used, and Models 3p, 3q and 3i investigate the role of our variables of interest on specific groups of RE policies.
More precisely, we conduct a PCA on three subsets of policies: price-based policies (i.e., tax credits or FITs), quantity-based policies (i.e., RECs) and R&D policies. See the Appendix for details.
[ Despite the large reduction of its effect, an interquartile change in PMR continues to account for slightly less than 1/5 of an interquartile change in REP_div. In summary, our results are qualitatively unchanged when using different indicators, especially for PMR and GDP_pc, but the effects are considerably smaller for REP_div.
The second part of IPPs allows us to reduce the unobserved correlation between the willingness to adopt RE, proportional to its expected cost, and liberalisation, which was positively correlated with the share of IPPs. 22 The effects of the other variables remain more or less unchanged for the price, quantity and innovation indicators. Only CORR is negative and significant for the indicator of price-based policy. However, the result is fully driven by Italy, which is a country with high corruption and substantial price-based support for RE.
idea that the incumbents' opposition to REPs is linked to technological competition (e.g., Dosi, 1982) . Model 3q indicates that the estimated coefficient of liberalisation is slightly smaller for quantity-based policies than for price-based ones.
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On the contrary, Model 3i confirms previous findings on the negative effect of liberalisation on public R&D expenditures (e.g., Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008) . This result resonates with the classical appropriability effect of competition on innovation and suggests the existence of several trade-offs in the effect of liberalisation on renewable energy innovation. 
Various Features of the Liberalisation Process
The design of liberalisations varies substantially across countries (Pollitt, 2012) and is the result of three distinct processes: granting freedom of access and choice to producers and consumers, privatising public utilities and unbundling network services from power generation. Table 5 offset by a negative and significant effect of privatisation (i.e., lower PMR_pub). In turn, the effect of unbundling tends to be negative and significant, but it changes depending on the RE indicator used. We thus conclude that unbundling plays a secondary role in the process of REP determination and focus our comments on PMR_ent and PMR_pub.
Observe that, conditional on PMR_pub (which captures large-scale privatisation), a lower PMR_ent implies the entry of small players such as municipalities, independent power producers, cooperatives and households that should have favoured the emergence of lobbies supporting renewable energies (e.g., Canton, 2008 ). An important result is that the effect of 23 However, the effect is larger in terms of explained inter-quartile variation insofar as variation in quantitybased policies is significantly lower than variation in price-based ones. 24 Two trade-offs have been emphasised by previous literature: one between applied and basic research (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008) and one between exploitation of existing discoveries and path-breaking research driven by public R&D (Popp, 2006 To recap, a reduction in the monopolistic power of state-owned utilities has a positive effect on REPs when various types of actors are ensured access to the grid instead of it being provided to only a few large private firms. For instance, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands are well recognised as having low entry barriers, strong public ownership and ambitious REPs (Pollitt, 2012).
Persistency in Renewable Energy Policies
Renewable energy policies are changing slowly over time and display high persistency with an estimated autoregressive coefficient of approximately 1. This finding does not come unexpectedly, as past decisions to implement REPs should affect the present behaviour of policy makers through learning and lobby formation. However, accounting for dynamics is not straightforward in our case because we must address the endogeneity of both the lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 1981) and our main variable of interest.
We propose two methodologies to address these issues. First, we include the lagged REP among the covariates. To fix endogeneity for the lagged dependent variable, we use its own lags and lagged differences as instruments, and PMR is instrumented as above. However, our external instruments for PMR become weaker in this dynamic setting.
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We thus propose a second, preferred approach to consider dynamics. In particular, we take the five-year average, take the first difference of our variables of interest and then re-estimate our main specification 25 More formally, a change from the 1 st to the 3 rd quartile in PMR_ent explains between 0.71 (for REP_fact) to 1.69 (for REP_price) of an interquartile change in REP. 26 In model 7, the F-statistics of excluded instruments is only 3.4 for PMR. using a 2SLS where the differenced-PMR is instrumented as usual. This second choice is validated by the fact that the 5-year averaged REP index, conditioned to time effects, does not display serial correlation. Table 6 presents the first approach. Individual effects are modelled using a standard within-transformation. The point estimates are qualitatively similar to those of the static specification. For instance, the effects of CORR and INEQ are very near statistical significance. Note that in this case, the point estimates should be interpreted as short-term effects; therefore, one should not be surprised by the fact that they are remarkably smaller than the point estimates of Model 3 in Table 3 . The long-term effects are instead nine times larger, and a persistent interquartile decrease in PMR triggers a considerable interquartile increase of 2.3 in REP_fact.
Model 6 of
Model 7 presents the results for the alternative first-difference 2SLS estimator. Observe first that the main results are qualitatively unchanged and that the magnitude of the effects is the same for PMR, GDP_pc and EN_DEP as in the FE specification of Model 3 in Table 3 .
Obtaining this result in a first-difference specification further corroborates our causal interpretation of the effect of PMR on REP. Among the other effects, INEQ is far from being statistically significant, but CORR is nearly significant with a p-value of 0.183. To summarise, we may conclude that PMR, GDP_pc and EN_DEP are the three variables that remain significant determinants of REPs in these demanding dynamic specifications.
[ Table 6 ABOUT HERE]
Conclusions
This paper investigates the effect of liberalisation in the electricity market on renewable energy policy indicators that measure a country's commitment to RE. We draw inspiration from political economy models of environmental policies and adapt the predictions of these models to the case of REP. Our main result is that energy market liberalisation has a positive and perhaps unintended impact on REPs. Although this result is in line with anecdotal evidence and previous empirical work, our IV strategy highlights a substantial downward bias in the OLS estimate of this effect. We argue that the difference between the IV and OLS estimator is due to the mismeasurement of electricity regulation and reverse causality, i.e., endogenous lobby formation. Remarkably, the effect of PMR is the second largest after that of GDP_pc, with an interquartile decrease in PMR explaining roughly 3/4 of an interquartile increase in our favourite REP indicator. Considering the effects of inequality, corruption and green lobbying, our results suggest that a hybrid politico-economic model, where both citizens' preferences and lobbying power are important, offers the most accurate explanation of REP determinants.
To provide a more transparent interpretation of the effect of liberalisation, we split the PMR index into its three components and find that a reduction in entry barriers fully captures the effect of PMR on REP. This finding suggests that a reduction in the monopolistic power of state-owned utilities has a positive effect on REPs when various types of actors are ensured access to the grid instead of it being provided to only a few large private firms. Because reducing entry barriers has a stronger effect on the two policy types that have stronger effects on innovation (i.e., price-based and innovation-based policies), we are inclined to explain this finding with the competition between two rival technological paradigms. The development of RE will increase decentralised and small-scale energy production and thus reduce the profits of large-scale generators, which fuels their opposition to REPs.
Our results are important for future and on-going research on energy markets. First, assessments of the effect of liberalisation on energy prices may be incomplete and misleading when not accounting for REPs as long as the cost of these policies are, at least partially, passed to consumers and REPs are affected by the liberalisation. Second, the welfare consequences of both liberalisations and REPs should be jointly assessed by accounting for the interaction highlighted by our paper. The explicit inclusion of these effects in energy modelling seems a promising avenue for illustrating the trade-offs between various objectives, i.e., energy security vs. price reductions, and the full consequences of specific market reforms. 
Instrument
Brief explanation Variable Construction Source Investment incentives
Capital grants and all other measures aimed at reducing the capital cost of adopting renewables. May also take the form of third party financial arrangements, where governments assume part of the risk or provide low interest rates on loans. They are generally provided by State budgets.
Dummy Variable International Energy Agency
Tax Measure Economic instruments used either to encourage production or discourage consumption. They may take the form of investment tax credits or property tax exemptions, to reduce tax payments for the project owner. Excises are not directly accounted for here unless they were explicitly created to promote renewables (for example excise tax exemptions).
Incentive tariff
Through guaranteed price schemes, the energy authority obliges energy distributors to feed in the production of renewable energy at fixed prices varying according to the various sources. Some countries (UK, Ireland) developed so-called bidding system schemes in which the most cost-effective offer is selected to receive a subsidy. This last case is also accounted for in the dummy, due to its similarity to the feed-in systems.
Level of price guaranteed (USD, 2006 prices and PPP)
International Energy Agency Cerveny and Resch (1998) Country specific sources REN21 Database (www.ren21.net)
Voluntary program
These programs generally operate through agreements between the government, public utilities and energy suppliers, where they agree to buy energy generated from renewable sources. One of the first voluntary programs was in Denmark in 1984, when utilities agreed to buy 100 MW of wind power.
Dummy Variable
International Energy Agency
Obligations
Obligations and targets generally take the form of quota systems that place an obligation on producers to provide a share of their energy supply from renewable energy. These quotas are not necessarily covered by a tradable certificate.
Dummy Variable International Energy Agency
Tradable Certificate
Renewable energy Certificates (REC) are used to track or document compliance with the quota system and consist of financial assets, issued by the regulating authority, which certify the production of renewable energy and can be traded among the actors involved. Along with the creation of a certificate scheme, more generally a separate market is established where producers can trade the certificates, creating certificate "supply", while the demand depends on political choices. The price of the certificate is determined through relative trading between the retailers.
Share of electricity that must be generated by renewables or covered with a REC. Notes: Standard errors are clustered by country. Significant levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Notes Model 6: we use ΔREP_fact from t-2 to t-5 and the average REP_fact from t-5 until t-1979 (the initial year of our analysis) as instruments for REP_fact (t-1). We instrument PMR in electricity using PMR in telecommunications and railways lagged 0, 1 and 2 years to increase goodness of fit of the first stage. All variables are detrended to eliminate year effects, while country effects are explicitly added. Notes Model 7: we take the 5-year average of all the variables and then take the long-difference; this explains the lower sample size. The instruments for ΔPMR elec. are ΔPMR tel. and ΔPMR rail. All variables are detrended to eliminate year effects. 
Appendix (for on-line publication only) A1. First Stage Results
A2. Data Sources
Renewable energy policies data. The dataset made available by the IEA contains detailed country fact sheets that allow to construct dummy variables reflecting the adoption time of selected REPs for most OECD countries. Where possible, we integrated this data with information on the stringency of the single policies. To the best of our knowledge, this is possible for the following three policy instruments: public renewable R&D expenditures, feed-in tariff schemes and renewable energy certificates (see Table 1 for a full description of the policies). Information on the first is also available in the joint IEA-OECD dataset, whereas the main references for feed-in tariffs are two reports compiled by the IEA (2004) and Cerveny and Resch (1998) , plus the REN21 website. Our measure of the stringency of renewable energy certificates (RECs) is the variable constructed by Johnstone et al. (2010) that reflects the share of electricity that must be generated by renewables. Table 1 .
A3. Policy Indicators
REP_FACT. PCA is interesting because of its ability to extract a small number of In presence of discrete data, the normality assumption that underlines the PCA method is violated as the skewness and kurtosis in the distribution of, i.e., dummy variable is much larger. This is likely to bias downward the pairwise correlations used to build principal components. A maximum likelihood estimator can overcome this issue and allows to obtain the unobserved, normally distributed, continuous variable from their observed discrete counterpart, i.e. the so-called polychroric correlations. Practically, the likelihood function is maximised with respect to both the thresholds of a multivariate Probit model and the matrix correlations among the underlined, but unobservable, variables. This allows to obtain such correlation matrix as if each variable was draw from a normal distribution. More important for us, this method can be easily extended to obtain correlations between continuous and discrete variables, i.e. so-called polyserial correlations. Finally, the derived correlation matrix is used to carry out a PCA in the usual way.
As documented by the large simulation study analysis of Kolenikov and Angeles (2009), the main advantage of using this polyserial correlation method is that the proportion of variance explained by each component is larger than with PCA. Our comparison of indicators confirms this finding. The first component alone explain 58% when using polyserial correlation, while only 40% is explain by the first PC when not correcting for such discrete variable bias. The downside is that the first principal component has a less clear interpretation in this case as several policies load on it. For this reason and to be consistent with previous works on environmental policy indicators, we choose to use the PCA indicator as our favorite one.
A4. Comparison of the Policy Indicators
As show by the correlation matrix presented in Table A3 , the differences between the three indicators are small. In fact, the cross-correlations are statistically significant and range between 0.75 and 0.91. This similarity is also confirmed by the country ranking presented in Table A4, [ TABLE A3 HERE] As an external validation, in Table A4 we compute the correlation of our three indicators with a widely used indicator of environmental policy, i.e. the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI). is the only one that displays a statistically significant correlation of 0.47 with the ESI. This further validates our choice of using it as main policy indicator.
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